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1 Introduction
We evaluate the bioeconomic performance of a cross-species flexibility (CSF) provision in a
multi-species fishery that is managed with individual fishing quotas (IFQs). An important goal
of CSF is to reduce over-quota discards which have been conjectured to arise in quota-managed
fisheries as fishermen have difficulty matching random harvests with quota holdings (Copes,
1986; Sanchirico et al., 2006; Squires et al., 1998; Woods et al., 2015). The problem may be a
particularly acute when catches and quotas must be aligned across multiple species (Squires et
al., 1998). CSF provisions allow flexibility in landings whereby an unanticipated catch overage,
i.e., a random harvest that exceeds a fisherman’s quota holding, can be legally landed against
the quota of another species. CSF provisions are used extensively in Icelandic fisheries and to
varying degrees in New Zealand, Canadian, and U.S. fisheries.1 The question of how effective
CSF provisions are in reducing discards and in meeting other management goals is unresolved
and the topic of this paper.
We present a model of a multi-product (multi-species) technology that captures unique
elements of commercial fisheries. First and foremost, almost all commercial fisheries world-
wide involve harvest of multiple fish species. Separate species cohabitate across spatially and
temporally heterogeneous marine environments. Commercial fishermen employ vessel capital,
labor, fuel, nets and hooks and bait to harvest fish. These inputs are aptly described as public
factors of production allocated to harvest multiple fish species usually concurrently. Impor-
tantly, the technology is joint with production-cost complementarities linked to the ecological
od individual species. Fishermen are however able to organize their operations, e.g., adjust
gear types, select fine-grained fishing locations, depths, and times of the day and year that
gear is set, bait and hook types, set trolling speeds, etc., to influence or target, albeit imper-
fectly, the mix of species intercepted and captured by their gear (Branch and Hilborn, 2008;
see also Turner, 2005, Singh and Weninger, 2009). The implication of targeting ability is that
the mix of harvested species now becomes an endogenous choice that will be based on the
private incentives of fishermen. CSF provisions offer flexibility to land overfished species, but
also allow directed targeting to increase fishermen’s private fishing profits. CSF therefore alter
the relationships between quota regulation and realized fishing mortality. We characterize this
relationship under a generic CSF regulation and show how quota regulation are impacted and
must be modified to meet management goals.
A first contribution of this paper is to fully characterize profit maximizing harvesting and
discarding behavior under a quota regulation with CSF provisions. We show that privately
optimal species-specific harvests and discards depend in complex ways on fish prices, operating
expenses, multi-species stock conditions, specific-specific quotas, and the particular form of the
CSF provision. Our results refine intuition first presented in Singh and Weninger (2009); over-
quota discards occur when regulations raise the costs of matching harvests and quotas. This
motive to discard will be present with or without randomness in the harvesting process.
A second contribution of this paper is an empirical analysis of discarding behavior in the
Gulf of Mexico commercial reef fish fishery. We study harvesting and discard patterns over a
period that spanned two distinct regulatory regimes: a command and control regulatory period
where fleet harvests were controlled with trip-level landings constraints and seasonal closures,
and a period where landings were controlled with IFQs, with CSF provisions. The discard
patterns match predictions of our model, and illustrate stark effects, particularly discards
choices, of the distinctly difference regulatory instruments. Not surprisingly, discards are
1Sanchirico, et al., 2006 review mechanisms that are designed to help fishermen balance catches and quotas
in fisheries throughout the world. Woods et al., 2015a, 2015b describe and evaluate the Icelandic program
which includes an elaborate system whereby a subset of species quota can be exchanged at rates determined by
previous year’s landings prices. The analysis in woods et al., 2015a is primarily descriptive of landings patterns
in Icelandic fisheries. Woods et al, 2015b includes simulations to illustrate the potential (negative) impacts
of CSF on fishery outcomes. Woods et al., 2015b focus on revenue maximizing utilization of the specific CSF
provisions in the Icelandic system.
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largest under per-trip landings limits. What has been predicted in theoretical work (Singh
and Weninger, 2015) but not shown empirically based on actual discard data from commercial
fisheries is that discards effectively fall to zero under the IFQ regulation.
In a decentralized regulatory environment, and under information-constrained regulatory
environments, CSF provisions will be exploited to address fishermen’s private profit maxi-
mizing objectives. This misalignment of incentives can result in unintended consequences for
regulators. A third contribution of our paper is to characterize second best quota management
policies under CSF. We consider a planners problem of selecting a sequence of species-specific
quotas to maximize the present discounted value of resource rents generated from a multiple
species fishery. For this problem the planner first solves for the privately optimal harvest and
discard choices of regulated fishermen under the quota regulation with CSF. We assume the
regulator announces quotas under uncertainty over the true stock conditions that will prevail
during the harvest season. The setting in intended to capture constraints operation in real
work quota-managed fisheries.
This paper studies cross-species flexibility in the exploitation of a renewable natural re-
source. A literature examining temporal flexibility in cap-and-trade pollution emissions regu-
lations has emphasized the advantage of allowing firms the option to bank or borrow permits
over time. In stochastic production environments temporal flexibility can enable polluting
firms to plan production and pollution abatement to take advantage of unanticipated eco-
nomic or environmental conditions (see Yates and Cronshaw, 2001; Innes, 2003; Leard, 2013).2
CSF can have a similar benefit, e.g., fishermen may exploit flexibility to land more of a more
abundant species’ stock, which can raise short term profits relative to the no-flexibility case.
The timing and mix of individual species’ harvests, however, has crucial impacts for future
stock abundance and long term resource sustainability. We show how CSF, if excessive, will
lower fishery value by limiting the regulators control over current harvests and correspondingly,
the regulators ability to manage individual stocks in a way that maximizes long term resource
rent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a model of a two-species
fishery that is regulated with species-specific quotas and a CSF provision. We derive privately
optimal harvesting and discarding behavior of regulated fishermen. We isolate conditions under
which discarding fish at sea raises fishermen’s profits, and the role of CSF provision in harvest
and discard outcomes. Section 3 considers the long-term management problem of choosing
quotas, under CSF provisions, to maximize the value of the fishery. We illustrate the tradeoff
between long term rent losses caused by a loss of regulatory control when CSF provision are in
place, and the short run gains from allowing flexibility to exploit favorable stock conditions in
a stochastic harvesting environment. Section 4 presents empirical evidence of discard patterns
predicted by our model using a unique data set from the Gulf of Mexico commercial commercial
reef fish fishery. Section 5 concludes and summarises the policy implications of the paper.
2 The Model
This section presents a model of a two-species fishery that is exploited by a large number of
identical fishermen. The fishery is regulated with species-specific IFQs with a cross-species
flexibility (CSF) provision that we describe shortly.
The regulatory environment we envision suggests the following timing of actions and in-
formation structure: The fishery is managed over an infinite horizon that is separated into
discrete regulatory cycles, which we take to be a single year. We simplify the model and divide
each year into a harvest phase which is followed by a stock-growth phase. We assume the reg-
ulator sets quotas at the start of each regulatory cycle, just before harvesting operations get
underway. Our model will include an information asymmetry wherein the regulator is uncer-
2The timing of emissions is arguably a less important determinant of the social damages from pollution. For
example, the damages from CO2 emissions are depend on the total accumulated quantity rather than the flow
of the pollutant any any particular time.
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tain about the stock growth that during the growth phase and, therefore, select species-specific
quotas under stock uncertainty. The nature of stock uncertainty is articulated below. After
species-specific quotas are announced, harvesting operations begin. We assume that because
fishermen are on the water constantly observing their catch relative to gear deployed, that
they fully observe stock abundance. In sum, fishermen know the quotas, stock abundance,
the factor input, output and quota trading prices and organize their harvesting operations ac-
cordingly to maximize private profits during the harvest phase. We first characterize optimal
harvest and discard choices of a representative fishermen during the harvest phased (within a
single regulatory cycle). The regulators problem of choosing quotas is considered in section 3.
We first introduce a costly targeting harvest technology and the CSF provision in a two-
species fishery. Let x ≡ {x1, x2} denote current stock abundance, which is assumed fixed
during the harvest phase.3 We use h ≡ {h1, h2}, l ≡ {l1, l2} and, d ≡ {d1, d2} to denote the
harvest, landings, and discards, respectively, of a representative fishermen.
The model employs a novel technology that features property of stock-dependent weak
output disposability (Turner, 1995; Singh and Weninger, 2009). The two-species harvest set is
defined as:
h ≡ {h1, h2} =
{
ν1
(
1 + sin
[
api
2
])
xµ1
ν2
(
1 + cos
[
api
2
])
xµ2
}
zγ . (1)
where z denotes a scalar index of factor inputs employed; ν1 and ν2 are positive scale
parameters, a is a parameter that defines the mix of the two species produced, µ is a non-
negative parameter measuring the stock effect, i.e., that rate at which harvests change with
stock size, and γ ∈ (0, 1] measures the productivity of the factor input.
Fishermen can control the harvest through the choice of z and a ∈ [−1, 2]. The latter
determines the point along the boundary of the output set, hereafter the harvest transformation
frontier (HTF). It is easily checked that for a ∈ [0, 1], the HTF exhibits the standard negative
marginal rate of product transformation. For a ∈ [−1, 0] ∩ [1, 2], the marginal rate of product
transformation is positive, which implies that a reduction in the harvest of one species is
possible only if the harvest of the second species is also reduced. Note that
a =

−1⇒ h ≡ {0, ν2xµ2zγ}
0⇒ h ≡ {ν1xµ1zγ , 2ν2xµ2zγ}
1⇒ h ≡ {2ν1xµ1zγ , ν2xµ2zγ}
2⇒ h ≡ {ν1xµ1zγ , 0}
In an unregulated environment a fisherman’s optimal (profit maximizing) choice of a will
lie between 0 and 1, i.e., the negatively-sloped segment of the HTF. For future use, we define
himin (z) ≡ νixµi zγ and himax (z) ≡ 2νixµi zγ
Clearly, for any z, a fisherman will choose hi (z) ∈ [himin (z) , himax (z)].
Figure 1 illustrates the HTF corresponding to three input levels, with z′ < z′′ < z′′′. Stock
abundance in the figure is such that the mix of two species stocks, i.e., x1x2 ≈ 1. Observed first
that the marginal rate of product transformation is negative for harvest vectors interior to rays
0A and 0C and is positive for harvest vectors outside of this region. Under the technology in 1,
inputs are required to search or target a particular species and/or avoid intercepting the other
species. If stocks are roughly equally abundant, a harvest vector of equal proportion, h1h2 ≈ 1,
will require fewest such targeting actions and therefore yield larger quantities of harvested fish.
3This simplifying assumption avoids the need to account for harvest phase stock depletion. The analysis and
results are unaffected qualitatively.
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Figure 1: WOD Harvest Set.
In contrast, suppose a harvest vector with a larger share of species 2 is chosen, e.g., h′′ in
figure 1. In this case some of z′ is spent searching for concentrations of the species 2 stock
and/or avoid intercepting the species 1 stock. It is in this sense that our technology exhibits
costly stock-dependent targeting of individual species.4
Figure 1 shows three harvest vectors h′′, h′ and h. h′′ is located in the discard region, h′ is
on the boundary and h lines within a no discard region of the harvest space. The three vectors
produce the same quantity h2, and increasing quantities of h1. For the reasons discussed
above, h′ can be harvested with a smaller input allocation than h′′. The cost of harvesting
h′ is therefore larger than the cost of harvesting h′′. The implication is that the harvest cost
function dual to 1 exhibits regions for which the marginal cost of harvesting an individual
species is negative (see Singh and Weninger, 2009). Along the ray from h′′ to h′ in the figure,
costs decline as h1 is increased (holding h2 fixed).
2.1 The fisherman’s problem
A representative fisherman begins the harvest phase with species-specific quotas, {q1, q2}. We
assume the CSF provision allows for a fraction α of species 1 quota to be used to land species
2 fish and vice versa.5 The fisherman’s profit maximization problem is:
4Empirical evidence in support of our technological assumptions is provided in section 4 below. Branch and
Hilborn (2008) provide additional evidence of commercial fishermen’s ability to control the mix of harvested
species. See Singh and Weninger, 2009 for further discussion of costly targeting technologies in multispecies
commercial fisheries.
5Alternate forms for CSF provision are easily formulated but add few additional insights. For example, the
amount of species i quota used to land species j fish could differ for each i. Alternatively, the rate at which
species-specific quota can be exchanged for other species quota may differ from unity as in Icelandic quota
management program (see Woods et al., 2015a).
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max
{hi,li}
Π = p1l1 + p2l2 − wz;
s.t.
l1 ≤ h1; l2 ≤ h2;
l1 ≤ q1 + αq2; l2 ≤ q2 + αq1;
l1 + l2 ≤ q1 + q2,
where the hi’s follow from (1), pi is the landings price for species i fish and w is the unit price
of z.
Notice that in the absence of flexibility provision, i.e., α = 0, the quota constraints reduce
to l1 ≤ q1 and l2 ≤ q2; the third constraint, l1 + l2 ≤ q1 + q2 is then redundant.
The Lagrangian for the above problem is:
L = p1l1 + p2l2 − wz (2)
+ λ (q1 + q2 − l1 − l2) (3)
+ ω1 (q1 + αq2 − l1) + ω2 (q2 + αq1 − l2) (4)
+ υ1 (h1 − l1) + υ2 (h2 − l2) , (5)
where λ, ωi, and υi are Lagrange multipliers. Necessary conditions for optimal hi, li and di
include:
li ≥ 0; pi − λ− ωi − υi ≤ 0; li (pi − λ− ωi − υi) = 0, (6a)
λ ≥ 0; λ (q1 + q2 − l1 − l2) = 0, (6b)
ωi ≥ 0; ω1 (q1 + αq2 − l1) = 0; ω2 (q2 + αq1 − l2) = 0, (6c)
υi ≥ 0; υi (hi − li) = 0. (6d)
Equation (6a) is the complementary slackness condition for landings. The multipliers λ and
ωi denote shadow prices for the aggregate and species-specific quota constraints, respectively,
and υi is the shadow price of species i harvest. Notice that constraints in equation (6c) cannot
both bind together since in this case the aggregate constraint (6b) would not be met. Therefore,
either ω1 or ω2 or both are zero.
The optimal choice of a follows,
a∗ =
2
pi
tan−1
[
υ1
υ2
ν1
ν2
(
x1
x2
)µ]
, (7)
and the optimal input choice is given by
wz∗ = γ (υ1h1 + υ2h2) . (8)
Notice that υi is non-negative with strictly positive value only if li = hi, i.e., there are no
discards for species i. Suppose υ1 = 0, then a
∗ = 0. In this case, the optimal input choice is
determined by its marginal contribution to harvest of species 2; marginal harvest of h1 has no
value since it discarded anyway. Symmetrically, when υ2 = 0 and a
∗ = 1, marginal harvest of
h2 is discarded and the input choice equates its unit cost with its marginal revenue from the
harvest of species 1.
We next identify privately optimal harvests, landings and discards consistent with the nec-
essary conditions (6a)-(6d), and solutions (7) and (8). In what follows, we will hold stock
conditions and prices fixed and study optimal choices for alternative {q1, q2} ∈ <2+. We par-
tition quota space into regions based on constraints that bind and constraints that are slack.
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Figure 2: Constrained Harvesting Behavior.
These regions are depicted graphically in figure 2. To help fix ideas, and without loss of
generality, we will assume p1 ≥ p2.
As in figure 1, notice that the rays 0A and 0C in figure 2 separate discard and no discard
regions. Quota allocations in regions III and VI, for example, induce positive discards of
species 1 fish. The reason is that fewer inputs are needed if more h1 is harvested. In region
VIII discards are zero. For the same reasons (but with species numbers reversed), species 2
discards are positive for q ∈ V, VII and X.
The technology in (1) exhibits diminishing returns when γ < 1, which is assumed in the
figure. The set of quotas that can be profitably harvested is bounded by a non-negative profit
condition. The segments AB and CB in figure 2 delineate regions of the harvest/quota space
for which the marginal profit of harvesting additional units at least one of the two species is
exactly zero. Point B identifies the harvests/quota at which marginal profit for both species
is simultaneously zero, i.e., the quota-unconstrained optimum.
While perhaps not immediately apparent, segments 0A and 0C are drawn symmetrically in
<2+ whereas B includes a larger share of h1. This is the result of our assumption p1 > p2. More
generally, the boundary of the discard set is determined by the structure of harvesting costs
and stock conditions; the landings mix and quota utilization is dictated by relative prices.
In the absence of flexibility, i.e., α = 0, and in our two-species case, a quota constraint
is a point in <2+ with legal landings li ≤ qi for i = 1, 2. With α > 0, the quota con-
straint is a line segment with northwest coordinate {(1− α) q1, q2 + αq1} and southeast co-
ordinate {q1 + αq2, (1− α) q2}. Figure 2 shows several examples of such line segments, labeled
S1, . . . , S5. We hereafter refer to quota constraint under a CSF provision as a flexible quota
constraint, or FQC.
Finally, it should be noted that regions I-X shift in <2+ with changes in factor input prices,
output prices, stock conditions, and under a different structural properties of the technology
in (1). Section 4 below investigates these relationships empirically.
We next summarize conditions within each region I-X in figure 2.
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Aggregate constraint is slack (λ = 0):
From (6b), we see that with λ = 0, the sum of landings fall below the sum of quotas l1 + l2 <
q1 + q2.
Region I: Neither species’ constraint binds; no discards. Note that ω1 = ω2 = 0.
Then υi = pi and a
∗ and z∗ follow from (7) and (8). Also di = 0 for both i. Then, l2 = h2 <
(1− α) q2. For q ∈ region I, profit maximizing harvest occurs are point B.
Region II: Species’ 1 constraint binds; no discards. For q ∈ region II, we have p1 >
ω1 > 0; ω2 = 0. Then υ1 = p1 − ω1 > 0 and υ2 = p2. Here, a∗, z∗, and ω1 are jointly
determined from l1 = h1 = q1 + αq2 and (7) and (8). Then, l2 = h2 < (1− α) q2.
In region II the q2 constraint is slack due to the fact that marginal profit of additional
harvests is zero, all else equal. If the price of species 2 fish were higher, the segment AB in
figure 2 would shift vertically.
Region III: Species’ 1 constraint binds; positive species 1 discards. In region III
p1 = ω1 > 0; ω2 = 0. Here, υ1 = 0, a
∗ = 0, l1 = q1 + αq2 < h1 min (z∗), where z∗ solves
wz∗ = γp2h2 max (z∗) .
Then, l2 = h2 < (1− α) q2.
In regions III the species 2 quota is slack while the species 1 quota binds, so tightly that
profit maximization involves positive discards of species 1 fish. For all q ∈ III, harvest occurs
point A in figure 2. For example, consider the quota allocation segment S3; harvest occurs at
point A however we have l1 < h1.
Region IV: Species’ 2 constraint binds; no discards. Now p2 > ω2 > 0; ω1 = 0. Then
υ2 = p2−ω2 and υ1 = p1. Here, a∗, z∗, and ω2 are jointly determined from l2 = h2 = q2 +αq1
and (7) and (8). Then, l1 = h1 < (1− α) q1
Region IV is the mirror image of region II; now the q1 constraint is slack due to the fact
that marginal profit of additional harvests is zero, all else equal. If the price of species 1 fish
were higher, the segment CB in figure 2 would shift horizontally to the right.
Region V: Species’ 2 constraint binds; positive species 2 discards. In region V we
have p2 = ω2 > 0; ω1 = 0. Here, υ2 = 0, a
∗ = 1, l2 = q2 + αq1 < h2 min (z∗), where z∗ solves
wz∗ = γp1h1 max (z∗) ;
Then, l1 = h1 < (1− α) q1.
Aggregate constraint binds (λ > 0):
We now consider regions for which λ > 0. Form the necessary condition 6b we have l1 + l2 =
q1 +q2. Here quotas are tight and the marginal profit from harvesting more fish remain positive
an d thus the aggregate quota binds. The question then becomes, toward which species is CSF
exploited, and when will discarding raise profit?
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Region VI: Species’ 1 constraint binds; positive species 1 discards. In region VI,
ω1 > 0 and λ = p1 − ω1 > 0; ω2 = 0; υ1 = 0 and υ2 = p2 − p1 + ω1 > 0. Since l2 = h2 and
υ1 = 0 and a
∗ = 0, z∗ is determined by,6
h2 max (z
∗) = (1− α) q2;
l2 = (1− α) q2 and h1 = h1 min (z∗) > l1 = q1 + αq2.
Region VII: Species’ 2 constraint binds; positive species 2 discards. Note that
ω2 > 0 and λ = p2 − ω2 > 0;ω1 = 0; υ2 = 0 and υ1 = p1 − p2 + ω2 > 0. Since l1 = h1 and
υ2 = 0 and a
∗ = 1, z∗ is determined by7
h1 max (z
∗) = (1− α) q1;
l1 = (1− α) q1 and h2 = h2 min (z∗) > l2 = q2 + αq1.
Region VIII: Species’ 1 constraint binds; no discards. Here, p1 > ω1 > 0;ω2 = 0;
υ1 = p1 − λ− ω1 > 0 and υ2 = p2 − λ > 0. Thus,
(p1 − υ1)− (p2 − υ2) = ω1;
the multiplier ω1, which is positive in region VIII, equals marginal profit from adjusting harvests
away from species 2 toward species 1. The boundary that separates regions VIII and IX is
determined by relative fish prices, with the size of region VIII increasing in p1.
Also, h1 = l1 = q1 + αq2 and h2 = l2 = (1− α) q2. The above conditions along with (7)
and (8) determine {a, z, υ1, υ2, ω1} .
Region IX: Species’ 2 constraint binds; no discards. Here, p2 > ω2 > 0; ω1 = 0;
υ2 = p2 − λ− ω2 > 0 and υ1 = p1 − λ > 0. Therefore,
(p2 − υ2)− (p1 − υ1) = ω2;
the multiplier ω2, positive in region IX, equals marginal profit from adjusting harvests away
from species 1 toward species 2. Also, h2 = l2 = q2 + αq1 and h1 = l1 = (1− α) q1. The above
conditions along with (7) and (8) determine {a, z, υ1, υ2, ω2} .
Region X: Species 1 constraint binds; positive species 2 discards. Up until now these
partitions appear symmetric. This will indeed be the case if p1 = p2. However, if p1 > p2,
and the aggregate constraint binds, λ ≥ p2 must hold for (6a-6d) to hold. When λ = p2,
υ2 = ω2 = 0. In this region, ω1 ∈ [0, p1 − p2]. Since υ1 ≥ 0, a∗ = 1, z∗ is determined by8
h1 max (z
∗) = q1 + αq2;
l1 = q1 + αq2 and h2 = h2 min (z
∗) > l2 = (1− α) q2.
It it is worth reiterating that region X exists solely due to unequal prices. It is easily seen
how the regions are modified when p2 > p1.
It is instructive also to contrast outcomes in regions VII and X. Recall that profit maxi-
mization requires CSF be exploited toward the landing of the highest marginal profit species.
With υ2 = 0 in both regions VII and X, this margin is tilted toward species 2 fish, since the
marginal profit is species 2 price. However, if p1 > p2, as we have assumed in figure 2, and at
6ω1 is in turn obtained from wz
∗ = γ (p2 − p1 + ω1)h2max (z∗) ;
7ω1 is in turn obtained from wz
∗ = γ (p1 − p2 + ω2)h1max (z∗) ;
8ω1 is in turn obtained from wz
∗ = γ (p1 − p2 − ω1)h1max (z∗) .
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particularly at low levels of h1, that marginal profit of landing species 1 fish dominates that of
species 2 even when υ2 = 1. Moving left to right, from region X to VII in the figure however,
corresponds to increasing species 1 marginal costs. When marginal costs of species 1 harvests
rise enough, the optimal quota allocation tips back in favor of species 2 fish, i.e., region VII.
2.2 Quotas, CSF and the operating region
We have the following results,
• If any portion of the FQC lies in the region I, the optimal landing choices are uncon-
strained and there are no discards.
• If the southeast endpoint of the FQC lies in either of the regions II, III, VI, VIII, and X,
the optimal harvests, landings, and discards are determined.
• If the northwest endpoint of the FQC lies in either of the regions IV, V, VII, and IX, the
optimal harvests, landings, and discards are determined.
• Notice that the adjacent regions VIII and IX are demarcated by the line segment 0B. If
the FQC crosses 0B, the aggregate constraint binds but no individual species’ constraints
bind, i.e., ω1 = ω2 = 0. Harvests equal landings and there are no discards. Since
p1/geqp2, we restrict λ ≤ p2 so that υi = pi − λ > 0. Then,
υ1 − υ2 = p1 − p2.
Also, li = hi implies,
h1 + h2 = q¯ ≡ q1 + q2;
the above two equations along with (7) and (8) determine {a, z, υ1, υ2}. The line segment
0c represents values of q¯ such that λ ∈ [0, p2] .
• If the FQC crosses segment 0C such that its northwest endpoint lies in region X but the
southeast endpoint lies in region VII, the choices are determined by ω1 = ω2 = υ2 = 0
and υ1 = (p1 − p2) . Here, a∗ = 1, and z∗ are determined by
wz∗ = γ (p1 − p2)h1 max (z∗) ,
with l1 = h1 and l2 = q¯ − l1 < h2 min (z∗).
This completes the mapping from the quota regulation with CSF provisions to fishermen’s
privately optimal harvests, landings and discards. We now investigate the implications for
addressing the broad management goal of maximizing the stream of resources generated in the
fishery.
3 Flexibility and Fishery Rent
This section considers the regulator’s problem of setting species-specific under stock uncer-
tainty. Ideally, the regulator would control species-specific harvests to sustain long-term fishery
value, while at the same time allow for some harvest flexibility across species to perhaps reduce
over-quota discards or to allow fishermen to exploit favorable stock abundance shocks. We first
develop sharp analytical insights under a simplified version of the our model to highlight these
tradeoffs. Technical details, solution techniques, and the results from the fully dynamic model
are presented below.
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3.1 A fixed proportions harvest technology with symmetric shocks
Let the harvest technology be given by
{h1, h2} = {x1, x2} zγ (9)
where z is as above; {x1, x2} are from the regulators perspective jointly distributed random
variables. To further simplify the presentation and focus on quota regulations under stock
randomness, it is assumed that {x1, x2} are perfectly negatively correlated. To begin with, we
assume that xi takes two values {ϕ, 1− ϕ} with equal probability; furthermore, when x1 = ϕ,
then x2 = 1− ϕ, and vice versa.9
We let ϕ > 12 , i.e., for any input allocation one species’ harvests will exceed the other
species’ harvest.
The regulator’s benefit function The regulator of a fishery not only cares about current
harvest profit, but also accounts for the prospective costs of current harvests for depleted future
stocks. We assume the regulator perceives the fishery’s value as
W ≡ pi (h1, h2)− κ1
2
h21 −
κ2
2
h22 (10)
where
pi (h1, h2) ≡ p1l1 + p2l2 − wz. (11)
Again landings may fall below harvests if fishermen choose to discard fish at sea. We will
focus on an IFQ equilibrium in which fishermen maximize (11) subject to landing constraints,
li ≤ qi.
We first examine the role of flexibility in a symmetric environment: we let κ1 = κ2 = κ;
also, p1 = p2 = p. We derive the first-best harvest outcomes, i.e., a case where harvesting
operations are fully controlled by a single sole owner. We then determine whether these first
best outcomes can be replicated under an IFQ equilibrium.
A caveat is in order for the assumed quadratic form for hi for the objective function in (10).
Current harvests reduce escapement, which may linearly or non-linearly impact next period’s
stocks. The latter in turn will be valued in terms of next period’s fishery benefits/losses (see
the details in the next Section). If one assumes that the stock growth function is linear in
escapement, and that the next period’s fishery value is concave in stocks, a convex cost in
terms of current harvests is justified. A quadratic term is therefore consistent with these
assumptions. Moreover, it also delivers a closed form solution for the results derived below,
which significantly helps in understanding the trade-offs between flexibility and control.
Note that parameters κi weigh the prospective costs of current harvests. Arguably, these
coefficients may depend on the current stock abundance. A higher stock abundance would
reduce the prospective costs of current harvests and therefore lower κi. If the quota allocation
choices are made after the stock growth is realized or after observing (x1, x2), a lower future
cost ceteris paribus would call for a higher harvest. To be as close to the first-best scenario,
the regulator would like to increase harvest of the higher abundance species. But the motive
for a higher harvest of the higher stock abundance species already operates via the technology
channel.10 Having κi as stock growth shock-contingent, in addition, will only strengthen
9These assumptions imply means, variances and correlation coefficient, respectively, equal to
E (xi) =
1
2
; σ2xi =
(
ϕ− 1
2
)2
; ρxixj = −1.
10Arguably, this may be the main first-order channel.
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the flexibility versus control results that we derive. Nonetheless, this generalization would
add clutter to algebra below without yielding additional insights. Therefore, we keep κi as
deterministically constant.
In what follows, we use a tilde (˜) and an asterisk (∗) to denote, respectively, values of
endogenous variables obtained under a sole-owner control and under IFQ equilibrium.
3.2 A social planning problem
The owner chooses harvests after observing stocks to maximize (10) subject to (9). Irrespective
of whether xi = ϕ or 1− ϕ, the problem can be stated as
p zγ − wz − κ
2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
)
z2γ (12)
To simplify the analysis further, let γ = 0.5. Then, the optimal input choice, irrespective
of stock realizations is given by
z˜ =
1
2
p
w + κ2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
)
2 . (13)
The optimal input allocation balances its marginal cost and marginal benefit. The term
κ
2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
)
in the denominator reflects that the fishery owner, in addition to considering
input cost w, accounts for the harvest impact on prospective future stocks.
From here, it is straightforward to compute harvest choices. For xi = ϕ:
h˜i =
1
2
ϕp
w + κ2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
) ;
h˜j 6=i =
1
2
(1− ϕ) p
w + κ2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
)
It is optimal to exploit the higher abundance of species i and harvest a relatively higher
amount.
Note, however, that the value of the fishery is decreasing in the stock variance:
W˜ =
1
4
p2
w + κ2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
) ,
since the denominator is decreasing in ϕ for all ϕ > 2. This is due to the convexity of
prospective costs in current harvests.
3.3 A standard ITQ equilibrium
As noted the regulator must set quotas before observing random stock abundance. Since the
two species are symmetric, quotas for both species are equal. Let q = q1 = q2 denote the quota
choice. The optimal regulation problem is solved backwards. First, the regulator derives the
harvest outcomes from a particular q. Assuming that both species’ landing constraints bind,
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i.e., li = q, one of the species’ harvest will exceed its landing and the overage will be discarded.
For xi = ϕ and xj 6=i = 1− ϕ, we have
h∗j = (1− ϕ) (z∗)0.5 = q = l∗j (14a)
h∗i = ϕ (z
∗)0.5 =
ϕ
1− ϕq > q = l
∗
i (14b)
and the discard of species i :
d∗i =
2ϕ− 1
1− ϕ q > 0.
Given the fishermen’s equilibrium choices (14a) and (14b), a regulator sets quotas {q∗, q∗}
to maximize the expected value Ex {W}, where W is as in (10). The problem can be stated as
max
q
{
2pq − w
(
q
1− ϕ
)2
− κ
2
(
1 +
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)2)
q2
}
. (15)
This readily obtains
q∗ =
p (1− ϕ)2
w + κ2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
) . (16)
Then, following (14a), the input is
z∗ =
 p (1− ϕ)
w + κ2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
)
 12 < z˜ = (2 (1− ϕ)) 12 z∗
It follows that for the species i with xi = ϕ,
h∗i = ϕ
p (1− ϕ)
w + κ2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
) ,
A comparison with the sole owner’s harvest choices shows
l∗i
l˜i
≤ h
∗
i
h˜i
= 2 (1− ϕ) < 1, for i = 1, 2.
The larger is the species-specific abundance gap, the smaller is the harvests of both species
under an optimal IFQ regulation. Since the overage of the higher abundance species is dis-
carded, the marginal benefits are decreasing in ϕ. An optimal regulation responds with reduc-
ing the quotas of both species.
Quota market prices We began by assuming that the landing constraints for both species
bind. In equilibrium, this requires that quota market prices for both species, which we will
denote as {r1, r2}, be positive. The species i with xi = ϕ is discarded at the margin, and
therefore its quota price ri = p. In equilibrium, the fishermen’s optimal input choice solves
wz∗ =
1
2
(p− rj)h∗j , (17)
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where species j has εj = 1− ϕ. Its equilibrium quota price is
rj = p− 2wq
∗
(1− ϕ)2
= p
κ
2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
)
− w
κ
2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
)
+ w
, (18)
where the last expression follows from (16). If the regulator assigns a sufficient weight on the
prospective costs of current harvests, i.e., κ2 >
w
(1−ϕ)2+ϕ2 , both species’ quotas bind in an IFQ
equilibrium.11
3.4 An ITQ equilibrium with cross-species quota flexibility
To get closer to the socially efficient harvests and landings, a regulator would like to set quota
rules in a manner that aligns species-specific harvests with respective abundance shocks as
a sole owner will do. We now consider a regulation that allocates a common quota q for
landing both species, but also allows for cross-species-flexibility (henceforth CSF). Specifically,
the regulation permits using α % of the quota of any species towards landing the other. The
landing constraint for either of the species becomes:
lˆi ≤ (1 + α) q subject to lˆi + lˆj 6=i ≤ 2q,
where âover a variable differentiates it from its counterparts in a first-best and a standard
IFQ equilibrium.
Suppose, at the time of harvest {x1, x2} = {ϕ, 1− ϕ}. Relative to the case with no flexi-
bility, the fishermen can now better utilize both quotas by choosing
lˆ1 = (1 + α) q ≤ hˆ1 = ϕ1−ϕ (1− α) q
lˆ2 = (1− α) q = hˆ2
}
if
1 + α
1− α ≤
ϕ
1− ϕ (19)
or
lˆ1 = 2ϕq = hˆ1
lˆ2 = 2 (1− ϕ) q = hˆ2
}
if
1 + α
1− α >
ϕ
1− ϕ (20)
Replicating the first best The latter condition (20) holds when α > 2ϕ − 1. In this
case, none of the species are discarded and the total quota is utilized without discards, i.e.,
hˆ1 + hˆ2 = 2q. Using (20) in (10), the regulator solves
max
q
{
2pq − w (2q)2 − κ
2
(
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2
)
(2q)2
}
Clearly, by setting qˆ = 12 z˜
1
2 , the regulator achieves the efficient outcome. This holds for all
α ≥ 2ϕ− 1. A CSF provision over and above 2ϕ− 1 is slack, because of the fixed proportions’
harvest technology. For whichever species has higher abundance, i.e., ϕ, a fisherman can use
(2ϕ− 1) % of the other species quota in addition to harvest 2ϕqˆ. The other species’ harvest
makes of the rest 2 (1− ϕ) qˆ. The CSF provision obtains the first-best by aligning the ratio of
the two equilibrium harvests at ϕ/ (1− ϕ), precisely what the technology commands.
11Since min
{
(1− ϕ)2 + ϕ2} = 1
2
, a sufficient condition is κ > 4w.
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Suboptimal CSF For α < 2ϕ− 1, discards of species 1 occurs
dˆ1 =
(
ϕ
1− ϕ −
1 + α
1− α
)
(1− α) q.
Using (19) in (10), the regulator’s problem can be stated as
max
q
2pq − (1− α)2
 w
(
1
1−ϕ
)2
+κ2
(
1 +
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)2)
 q2
 .
The optimal quota allocation with CSF12
qˆ =
q∗
(1− α)2 (21)
Let λ denote the multiplier on aggregate quota constraint that holds with equality: lˆ1+ lˆ2 =
qˆ1 + qˆ2, and let ω1 be the multiplier on species 1 landing constraint that also holds with
equality: lˆ1 = (1 + α) qˆ. Since species 1 is discarded at the margin, r1 = p = λ + ω1 while
r2 = λ+ αω1 = p− (1− α)ω1. It can be shown that
r2 = p− 2wqˆ
(
1− α
1− ϕ
)2
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. A CSF provision of α ≥ 2ϕ− 1 replicates the sole owner outcome in an IFQ
equilibrium. The quota allocation for any α ∈ [0, 1] is given by
qˆ =

(
1−ϕ
1−α
)2
p
w+κ
2 ((1−ϕ)2+ϕ2)
, for α < 2ϕ− 1
1
4
p
w+κ
2 ((1−ϕ)2+ϕ2)
= 12 z˜
1
2 , forα ≥ 2ϕ− 1
The value of fishery can be expressed as
Wˆ =

p2
w
(
1
1−ϕ
)2
+κ
2
(
1+
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)2) 1(1−α)2 < W˜ , for α < 2ϕ− 1
W˜ = 14
p2
w+κ
2 ((1−ϕ)2+ϕ2)
, for α ≥ 2ϕ− 1
Finally, for α > 2ϕ − 1 the quota price of both species equals p, while for α < 2ϕ − 1 is
given by ri = p for the species i with xi = ϕ, while for j 6= i, rj remains fixed at its value given
in (18).
Suppose a regulator is constrained to set α < 2ϕ−1. Then some of the harvest of the higher
abundance species is discarded. As flexibility (α) rises, discards diminish and the regulator’s
marginal value of quotas rises. This induces the regulator to set a higher quota to increase
fishery value. If regulator could choose α optimally, it will choose αˆ = 2ϕ− 1. This perfectly
12Notice that the above problem nests with (15) for α = 0.
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aligns fish landings with the harvests. By setting the total quota qˆ = 12 z˜
1
2 , the regulator can
implement first best harvests. In effect, αˆ ≥ 2ϕ − 1 completely insures the fishermen against
stock abundance shocks and thereby allows the regulator to behave as a sole owner.
When α > 2ϕ+ 1, neither of the individual landing constraints bind. Both species’ quotas
are equally valuable at the time of harvest and so are their market prices. A somewhat
surprising result is that the two quota prices are invariant to changes in α for α ∈ (0, 2ϕ− 1).
For α in this range, the higher abundance species’ quota price is equal to its market price,
whereas for the lower abundance species its quota price depends on its contribution to the
aggregate landing as well as its contribution to the landing of the higher abundance species.
With a higher α, more of the lower species’ quota can be used towards landing the higher
abundance species, which raises its quota market value. But a higher α is also accompanied by
a rise in qˆ, which relaxes the aggregate landing constraint and lowers the market value of the
marginal quota. The two effects turn out to be exactly offsetting due to a fixed proportions
harvest technology.
It is worth noting that the results stated in Proposition 1 continue to hold even when stock
abundance take multiple/continuous values, as long as stocks are symmetric and negatively
correlated. The CSF provision in this case will offer insurance against the most extreme stock
conditions. If the realized stocks are less spread, the flexibility provision will be only partially
utilized. However, this may not hold when the harvest technology allows for cross-species
harvest substitution. The CSF provision in case of low-spread abundance may be overused
relative to what a sole owner would desire. We turn to this question next.
3.5 An IFQ-CSF equilibrium with output substitution
While the preceding results help understand the role, and build a case, for CSF provisions,
the assumption of a fixed output proportions’ technology is restrictive and not supported
empirically as we show in the next section. In general, for a given input allocation, fishermen
can choose the mix of harvested species. We therefore generalize the results above to our more
general costly targeting harvest technology, while maintaining our simplifying assumptions for
random stock conditions:
h ≡ {h1, h2} =
{
ν1 ϕ
µ
(
1 + sin
[
api
2
])
,
ν2 (1− ϕ)µ
(
1 + cos
[
api
2
]) } zγ . (22)
We keep with our symmetry assumptions for now, and consider the case with ν1 = ν2 = ν.
Sole owner’s choices A sole owner’s optimal harvesting choices are now characterized by
wz˜ = γ
[(
p− κh˜1
)
h˜1 +
(
p− κh˜2
)
h˜2
]
; (23a)
a˜ =
2
pi
tan−1
[
p− κ h˜1
p− κ h˜2
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)µ]
. (23b)
The first equation is standard: it equalizes the marginal input cost inclusive of its impact on
prospective stocks, with its marginal revenue benefit. The second equation allows the fishermen
to optimally choose a to substitute between the two species along the harvest possibilities
frontier as displayed in figure 1. Equations (23a) and (23b) along with (22) uniquely solve for
{z˜, a˜} and thereby
{
h˜1, h˜2
}
for any realization of ϕ. However, even with γ = 12 and either
µ = 1 or 12 , it is no longer possible to obtain closed-form expressions. Therefore, we rely on
numerical computations for further analyses.
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Figure 3: Cross-Species Flexibility and Stock Uncertainty.
An ITQ equilibrium with CSF Continue to assume for now that xi takes values {ϕ, 1− ϕ}.
Figure 3 displays the harvest frontier for the two possible stock realizations. Suppose the sole
owner’s state-contingent optimal harvest choices are at points C and B on the two possible
frontiers.
Once again, with symmetry assumptions, the regulator sets equal quotas qˆ for both species.
Let the CSF provision allow α % cross-species quota use, i.e., the lˆi ≤ (1 + α) qˆ. The details
of how to compute an IFQ equilibrium for the general case are discussed in section 2 and for
brevity are omitted here. For the simple two shock case in figure 3, the question we want to
answer here is: How can a regulator optimally set {qˆ, αˆ} to achieve the preferred harvests?
The answer is straightforward:
qˆ =
h˜1 + h˜2
2
; αˆ =
h˜1 − h˜2
h˜1 + h˜2
where h˜i relates to the case with x1 = ϕ at point B in figure 3.
13 It is easily checked in figure
3 that the full quota is landed, i.e., lˆ1 + lˆ2 = 2qˆ for both stock realizations. Furthermore, for
xi = ϕ, lˆi = (1 + α) qˆ. A flexibility provision less than αˆ will either require a higher input
allocation in equilibrium or will be accompanied by discards.14 In either case, the equilibrium
is inefficient relative to the sole-owner case.
But how about a flexibility provision that exceeds αˆ as defined above? Under a fixed
proportions’ technology, additional flexibility remains underutilized as stated in Proposition
1. However, with output substitutability additional flexibility will be exploited to obtain an
identical harvest revenue (2pqˆ) at lower input employment, e.g., on a point such as D in figure
3 for {x1, x2} = {1− ϕ,ϕ}. The sole owner harvests are no longer implemented in the IFQ
equilibrium and the value of the fishery will be lower.
To help understand the above argument, we conduct the following counterfactual thought
experiment. Suppose the regulator allocates quotas after observing the shocks. For example,
when {x1, x2} = {ϕ, 1− ϕ}, the regulator allocates {q1, q2} =
{
h˜1, h˜2
}
at point B in figure 3,
but also allows for a CSF of α = 10 %.
13Subscripts are symmetrically reversed for x2 = 1− ϕ.
14Note that if α 6= αˆ, the regulator’s quota allocation will be different than qˆ.
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Figure 4: Harvests under First Best and IFQ Regulations.
Figure 4 presents the equilibrium harvest deviations under an IFQ equilibrium under this
unwarranted flexibility provision. The parameter values assumed are p = w = 1;µ = 0.5; γ =
0.7;κ = 2.5; ϕ is allowed to take 11 equally spaced values between [ϕmin, ϕmax] = [0.3, 0.7] .
The schedules labelled as “IFQ” represent the market equilibrium outcomes. It is evident that
when a species abundance is relatively higher, the market equilibrium incentivizes a higher
harvest of this species relative to its socially optimal value.
Thus, increasing flexibility (α) beyond what is optimal may lead to overexploitation of
higher abundance species and further decrease the fishery value. However, when the flexibility
(α) reaches a sufficiently high value, no further incentive remains for overexploitation and the
CSF is not fully utilized. Once again, from this point on, the fishery value stays constant with
further increases in α.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
α0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
W
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* %
Figure 5: Flexibility and Fishery Rent.
Figure 5 displays the fishery value Wˆ under an IFQ regulation, as a function of CSF α.15
The key lesson to be drawn from this exercise is that in general there is a unique {αˆ, qˆ}
that maximizes the fishery value in an IFQ regulation.
15It bears emphasis that optimal qˆ has the same shape as Wˆ above in response to changes in α. The response
of qˆ to α is not presented here to conserve space.
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3.6 Asymmetric prices
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
α
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
W
^ -W*
W
* %
Figure 6: Flexibility and Fishery Rent: Asymmetric Prices.
We now turn to a fishery with price differences across species. To isolate the role of
differential valuations, we let {p1, p2} = {1.5, 1}; the technology and random stock abundance
remain as above. Figure 6 shows how welfare varies with α. The intuition behind Wˆ rising in
α for small values is simple. Since flexibility insures against randomness in stock conditions,
the rise in welfare for small values of α is consistent with the previous examples.
Figure 7 provide further intuition. A price differential across the two species tilts the
harvest mix towards the higher-valued species. In general, a common CSF provision of α % is
now used relatively more frequently to land higher priced species. This effect can be seen in
panel (a) and (b) of figure 7.
The first best
{
h˜1, h˜2
}
represent sole-owner’s choices. A higher ϕ commands a higher h˜1
and a lower h˜2. Suppose the regulator assigns these stock-contingent harvest levels as quotas
after observing xi’s and, in addition, allows for a flexibility α = 0.1. Even when species 2 stock
is relatively high (low ϕ), the CSF provision is used to harvest species 1. When the two species
were equally valued, deviations from the first best is symmetric across both species (see figure
5).
Panel (c) and (d) of figure 7 show the regulator’s optimally quota choices {qˆ1, qˆ2}. The
regulator understands that as CSF (α) rises, CSF will be used to land the higher value species
1. To offset, an optimal regulation reduces qˆ1 and increases qˆ2. This is what explains the flat
portion in figure 6 above.
Contrast the regulator’s optimal quota response to the CSF provisions under price asymme-
try with the symmetric example. In the symmetric case, the two quotas are identical. When
α is increased beyond its welfare maximizing value, quota adjustment requires an identical
reduction in both species’ quotas, which in turn lowers fishery value. With asymmetric prices,
quota adjustments under higher α maintain the same fishery value for a range of α. However,
when α becomes sufficiently large, the quota of the higher-valued species becomes so small
(see panel (c)) that its utilization towards the lower-priced species, in case the high abundance
species, does not provide adequate landing coverage for lower priced species. Therefore, a
further increase in α lowers the value of fishery. This explains the decline in Wˆ for high values
of α.
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Figure 7: First Best vs. IFQ Equilibrium Outcomes.
4 Discarding in the GOM reef fish fishery
This section evaluates harvest and discard patterns in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) commercial
reef fish fishery. We first present evidence to support the technological assumptions implicit in
our costly targeting technology. We evaluate and test the predictions of our model in section
2 against discards patterns observed in our data. Finally, we calibrate the costly targeting
technology and further evaluate the role of CSF provisions and other regulations in the decision
to discard fish at sea and in the general management of the GOM reef fish fishery.
4.1 Data and regulations
The Gulf of Mexico (GOM) commercial reef fish fishery is a complex of bottom-dwelling species
consisting of red, black, yellowedge, gag, warsaw and other species of groupers, amberjacks,
triggerfish, porgies, tilefish, and red, vermilion, and other snapper species. Vertical hook and
lines and longline gear are the main gear types used. Our data are from 2005-14 commercial
reef fish fishing seasons. In 2014, the the commercial fleet generated $69.884 m. in revenue
on 19.459 m. pounds across all reef fish species. In the same year, red and vermilion snapper,
red grouper, and gag grouper accounted for $47.473 m. (67.93%) of the revenue and 11.799 m.
lbs. (60.64%) of total landings.
Our data period spans two contrasting regulatory approaches which were introduced for at
different times for different reef fish species. Prior to 2007, annual commercial harvests of all
species were controlled with an input-based regulation. Under this controlled access regime,
annual harvests were constrained through a system of vessel licensing that capped the number
of boats in the fishery, limits on per-trip landings, seasonal closures where all landings were
prohibited, and various gear restrictions. The second regulatory regime utilized output controls
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in the form of a multi-species individual fishing quota (IFQ) regulation, with CSF provisions.
Red snapper was managed under controlled access during two years of our data period
(2005-06) and was switched to IFQs in 2007. Prior to the switch to IFQs, commercial reef fish
vessel operators held one of three types of red snapper endorsement permits: no endorsement;
a class II endorsement; or a class I endorsement. The endorsement program capped the total
pounds of red snapper that could be landed on each trip from port, during calendar periods in
which the red snapper fishery was open. Landings are prohibited during red snapper closures.
Closures were spaced throughout each year to avoid harvest gluts and low dockside prices.
Class II and class I permit holders were allowed to land 200 and 2,000 pounds of red snapper
per trip, respectively. Red snapper landings by non endorsement vessels were prohibited at all
times. Hereafter we refer to red snapper permit holders as no endorsement, class II and class
I boats.
Under the red snapper IFQ program, seasonal closures ended. It should be noted that the
initial allocation of red snapper quota was gratis and based on historical catch records. The
bulk of the quota was allocated to class 1 and 2 endorsement permit holders.
Groupers and tilefish species were managed under controlled access for 5 of our 10 data years
(2005-09). Key regulations included closures and a trip limit regulation that capped landings
of shallow water groupers including red, gag, black, yellowfin, and yellowmouth groupers, rock,
red and speckled hind, scamp, and others. In 2005, the cap was set at 10,000 per trip until
50% of the annual species-group total allowable catch (TAC) was reached. The trip limit then
dropped to 7,500 pounds and then to 0 when the full TAC was landed. From 2006-09 the cap
was lowered to 6,000 pounds per trip, and 0 when the TAC was met.16
In 2010, the Grouper-Tilefish Individual Fishing Quota, hereafter GT-IFQ program was
introduced. Quota was issued for five species or species groups: (1) red grouper; (2) gag
grouper; (3) shallow water groupers, which included black grouper, scamp, yellowfin grouper
and yellowmouth grouper; (4) deep-water groupers, which included snowy grouper, speckled
hind, warsaw grouper, and yellowedge grouper; (5) tilefish, which included blueline tilefish,
golden tilefish and goldface tilefish.
The GT-IFQ program allows for unlimited cross-species flexibility for the species included
in the (3) shallow water groupers, (4) deepwater groupers and (5) tilefish aggregates. Operating
rules included an additional but limited CSF provisions for red and gag grouper.17 Under this
provision, a maximum share of red and gag grouper quota is designated as multi-use quota.
The quantity of multi-use quota varied by species and year as shown in table 1.
Year Gag Multi-use Red Multi-use
2010 8% 4%
2011 8 0
2012 8 0
2013 70 0
2014 47 0
2015 33 4.8
Table 1: Red and Gag Grouper Multi-Use Quota, 2010-15.
In 2010, 4% of a fisherman’s red grouper quota could be used to land gag grouper and 8% of
a fisherman’s gag grouper quota could be used to land red grouper. During 2011-14, gag quota
could be used to land red grouper, following the percentages in table 1, whereas the no red
grouper multi-use quota was set to zero. The explanation is an unfavorable gag grouper stock
assessment which prompted additional regulatory measures to reduce gag grouper harvests.
16The gag fishery was closed from February 15 through March 14 apparently to protect gag during a period
in which spawning behavior is concentrated.
17The program also includes a cross-seasonal flexibility provision whereby 10% of the last trip’s harvest could
be legally landed against a fisherman’s following year quota allocation. The quantity of discards impacted by
this provision is likely small.
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In 2015, apparently after gag grouper stocks have shown signs of recovery, 33% of gag quota
could be used to land red grouper and 4.8% of red grouper quota could be used to land gag
grouper (SEDAR, 2014).
4.2 Discarding patterns
We merge trip-level logbook landings data with fishermen’s trip discard records for major gear
types used in the eastern region of the GOM reef fish fishery (east of the Mississippi delta).18
Data include for each trip, the date of departure, the days the vessel spent at sea, the quantity
of fish landed and discarded by species, the type and quantity of gear used on the trip, crew
size, area fished, and fishing depth, among other factors.
The discard section of logbook reporting system asks fishermen to report species, number,
average weight, the condition of discarded fish,19 gear type, area and the depth at which the
discards fish were caught. Fishermen are also asked to choose one of five reasons for which
the fish was discarded: 1. Regulations - Not Legal size; 2. Regulations - Out of Season;
3. Regulations - Other; and 4. Market Conditions. Instructions to fishermen make a clear
distinction between undersize discards and discards due to seasonal closures, landings limits
and quota constraints. Hereafter we consider discards that are attributed to non-size-limit
regulations (reasons 2 and 3), which we assume are discards due to closures and trip limits
under controlled access regulation and insufficient quota under IFQs. An analysis of undersize
discarding is reserved for future work.
Reef fish discards occur at sea in the absence of observer coverage. Fishermen report num-
bers and average weight of discarded fish by species when the vessel returns to port at the end
of a 3-6 day trip. The accuracy of self-reported discard numbers and individual fish weights
cannot be verified. Examination of the data indicate consistent patterns and reasonable values
for the numbers of fish discarded. The data included some extreme (mostly high) reported
values for average weights of discarded fish.20 To reduce the effects of reporting anomalies,
we replace self-reported average fish weights (for discarded fish) with species-specific average
weights obtained from observer data collected by the Southeast Fisheries Science Center. We
calculate species-specific average weights for fish below and above the legal length limit and
replace fishermen’s self-reported average weights with survey data averages.21 We then calcu-
late total discarded pounds by species using the reported discard numbers times average fish
weights.
Our data contain 75,564 trips taken in the eastern region of the fishery from 2005-14.22
We focus on hook and line gear types which include bandit, handline, trolling and bottom
longline gear types. These gears accounted for 75,564 trips (98%) of trips taken, 93.00 % of
18Bandit, handline and longline gear trips are examined in the region east of the Mississippi delta along the
western Florida coast to the Florida Keys.
19A choice out of six discard conditions are offered: Dead All, Dead Majority, Alive All, Alive Majority, Kept,
and Unable to Determine.
20Reef fish fishermen are instructed to report “the number of animals for each species discarded” and “the
estimated average individual weight in whole pounds for each species discarded.” The outliers are concentrated
in the average fish weight section. For example, values of 1,500 pounds for red snapper, 1,003 pounds for
vermilion snapper and 300 pounds for red grouper are clearly out of bounds. One explanation is that these
reported values are the result of a misreading of the instructions, e.g., total discarded pounds were entered
rather than average weight per discarded fish.
21We match survey weights to fish lengths using the reported discard reason. For example, if the discard
reason was “NOT legal size”, an average weight of below-legal-length fish from the survey data is used. If
the reported discard reason is due to a regulatory constraint, average weight for fish longer than the minimum
length limit is used.
22We drop 3,532 trips that landed primarily shark species (75% or more of total trip landings), and 202 trips
with incomplete vessel and gear deployment data.
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total landed pounds, and 96.81 % of revenues during 2005-14. The analysis that follows will, in
some cases require discard data information only, in which our data contain 17,568 complete
observations. When the analysis require both discard and cost information, we utilize the
10,107 observations that report discard and have complete trip expense information.23
4.3 Red snapper discarding
No Endorsement Class II Vessels Class I Vessels
Year TAC N hi
di
hi
hi∑
hj
N hi
di
hi
hi∑
hj
N hi
di
hi
hi∑
hj
2005 4.19 199 115.68 0.22 0.24 203 190.81 0.12 0.49 76 783.20 0.15 0.68
2006 4.19 235 137.34 0.22 0.37 163 157.59 0.19 0.41 32 670.39 0.13 0.60
2007 2.76 152 242.98 0.14 0.30 254 342.52 0.07 0.46 133 1,176.62 0.12 0.59
2008 2.30 524 259.76 0.04 0.33 401 368.01 0.03 0.57 323 804.25 0.03 0.53
2009 2.30 339 385.54 0.04 0.45 273 585.58 0.03 0.66 157 1,309.75 0.00 0.58
2010 2.82 411 430.19 0.03 0.51 293 454.01 0.04 0.53 250 1,335.82 0.01 0.65
2011 3.26 626 497.75 0.09 0.32 380 600.43 0.04 0.48 226 1,264.35 0.00 0.51
2012 3.51 608 685.86 0.07 0.66 327 406.21 0.06 0.44 226 1,090.62 0.02 0.50
2013 4.13 600 849.80 0.02 0.62 382 377.02 0.01 0.42 150 2,209.47 0.00 0.70
2014 5.05 508 552.56 0.01 0.48 226 248.70 0.03 0.44 212 1,815.33 0.00 0.75
Table 2: Red Snapper harvest/discard activity, 2005-14. TAC is total allowable catch reported
in millions of pounds; N indicates the number of trips reporting positive red snapper harvest;
hi denotes the average pounds harvested per trip;
hi∑
hj
is the landings-weighted average ratio
of discarded to harvested pounds per trip; hi∑hj is the landings-weighted average ratio of the
harvested red snapper pounds to total harvested pounds per trip.
Table 2 reports 2005-14 harvest and discard information, across three vessel types, for trips
reporting positive harvests of red snapper. We also report the red snapper commercial total
allowable catch (TAC) in millions of pounds, the number of trips in the sample, the average
harvested pounds per trip, a landings-weighted average of the ratio of discarded to harvested
pounds, and the landings-weighted average red snapper harvest share, i.e., the trip red snapper
harvest divided by the trip’s total harvested pounds.
Observe first that the discard to harvest ratio dihi varies systematically across vessel type and
across years as quota constraints are lifted. The 10 year average value is 0.09 for no endorsement
vessels, 0.06 for class II vessels and 0.05 for class I vessels. The discard-harvest ratio declines
across years beginning in 2007, the first year that red snapper IFQ program. In 2007, trip
limits were replaces with a seasonal landings limit; the sharp drop in the discard/harvest ratio
under IFQ regulation is not surprising.
One interpretation of the result in table 2 is that class I vessels, who were allocated the
largest shares of red snapper quota,24 have organized their operation to fully exploit the eco-
nomic incentives outlined in Singh and Weninger (2015).25 On the other hand, table 2 shows
23Of the 75,564 total eastern trip observations, 12,125 (16.0 %) recorded both discard and trip expense
information. Trip observations with missing fuel expenses were dropped leaving 10,107 trips with complete
discard and cost information. Appendix 7 reports descriptive statistics. Small differences in vessel characteristics
and harvesting activity exist across the sample subsets and therefore the results that follow should not be directly
extrapolated to the entire fishery.
24The initial red snapper allocation was based on landings history, which by virtue of the endorsement
regulation, favored class I boats.
25Singh and Weninger (2015) show that discarding fish at sea due to insufficient quota is cost inefficient and
will not be observed in a rational quota market trading equilibrium (in the absence of trading frictions).
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evidence that adjustments to quota holdings and harvesting practices did no occur immediately
in 2007. The average pounds of red snapper harvested per trip and the discard-harvest ratio
for no endorsement and class II vessel types exhibit strong trends during 2007-12. The drop
off in dihi is immediate for class I boats.
The results in table 2 offer compelling evidence that reef fish fishermen control the mix
of species harvested with their gear. The share of red snapper in the total trip pounds is
considerably lower for no endorsement boats than for class II and class I boats in the early
data years. The red snapper harvest share for no endorsement boats has increased during the
IFQ regime, presumably as these vessel operators acquire red snapper quota.
Average harvested pounds per trip has increased since the 2007 switch to IFQ regulation.
This pattern is also not surprising given that trip-level landings limits were dropped in 2007.
Class II Vessels Class I Vessels
N hi di
di
hi
hi∑
hj
N hi di
di
hi
hi∑
hj
Open (254 days) 263 205.99 40.66 0.21 0.42 77 997.08 199.04 0.15 0.48
Closed (476 days) 203 51.63 47.79 0.97 0.05 48 87.51 82.70 0.94 0.04
Table 3: Endorsement Vessel Harvest and Discards, 2005-06.
Closer examination of class I and class II vessel harvest and discards patterns during the
controlled access regime offers further evidence of endogenous targeting. In 2005-06, the red
snapper fishery was open (landings were permitted) on 254 days and closed on 476 days. Table
3 breaks down the simple average per trip harvests, discards, discard-harvest ratio, and harvest
shares by endorsement class.
The results show notable and perhaps predictable patterns. Vessels harvested more red
snapper when the fishery is open. During closures the sample mean value of the discard-
harvest ratio is 0.97 for class II boats, and 0.94 for class I boats. During openings, the sample
average discard-harvest ratio falls to 0.21 and 0.15 for class II and class I boats, respectively.
We also see stark differences in average red snapper harvest shares during open and closed
periods. For class II boats, the average red snapper harvest share is 0.42 when red snapper is
open and falls to 0.05 when red snapper is closed. Similarly, for class I boats; the average red
snapper harvest share is 0.48 during open periods and 0.03 during closures.
4.4 Grouper discarding
Table 4 reports annual harvest and discard information for our sample observations that re-
ported positive harvests of red and gag grouper. The table includes the commercial TAC26 in
millions of pounds, the percent of sample trips that reported positive discards, average har-
vested pounds per trip, the landings-weighted average of the discard-harvest ratio, and the
landings-weighted average of the per-trip species-specific harvest share.
Average per-trip harvested pounds of red grouper show considerable variability across years,
with a fairly sharp increase beginning in 2011; the second full year of the GT-IFQ program.
Average per-trip harvest of gag grouper is flat or declining during the 2010-14 GT-IFQ regime.
Grouper species were not regulated with the same strict per-trip landings limits that were used
for red snapper. The 6,000 pound per trip landings limit (all shallow water groupers) likely
did not bind for most vessels on most trips.27 Landings data indicate that a small fraction of
trips, 28 of the total 7,153 (0.39%) in our sample landed 5,500 pounds of the 6,000 pound limit
during 2005-09.
26Note that a species-specific TAC for Gag began in 2010 with the introduction of IFQs. Prior to 2010, gag
was included in a shallow-water grouper TAC which was set at 9.98 million pounds from 2005-09.
27Assessing the extent to which this landings constraint was binding is difficult because trips landing more
than 6,000 pounds are not observed in our data.
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Red Grouper Gag Grouper
Year TAC N % trips
(di>0)
hi/trip
di
hi
hi∑
hj
TAC N % trips
(di>0)
hi/trip
di
hi
hi∑
hj
2005 5.31 701 71.18 731.73 0.16 0.63 9.98 497 64.39 449.33 0.11 0.43
2006 5.31 589 77.08 992.15 0.24 0.79 9.98 432 53.47 308.96 0.13 0.39
2007 5.31 816 63.36 897.60 0.18 0.77 9.98 609 32.18 353.14 0.06 0.45
2008 5.31 1,441 9.16 558.70 0.01 0.71 9.98 1,079 4.36 260.44 0.00 0.46
2009 5.75 905 8.51 696.54 0.01 0.75 9.98 643 4.51 159.17 0.01 0.30
2010 5.75 876 6.62 684.99 0.01 0.76 1.41 711 4.92 129.50 0.00 0.19
2011 4.46 1,232 5.28 1,268.91 0.00 0.75 0.43 866 22.17 163.59 0.06 0.13
2012 5.37 1,166 3.09 1,199.20 0.00 0.72 0.54 887 16.35 220.82 0.05 0.18
2013 5.53 1,209 1.74 1,037.99 0.00 0.71 0.71 1,005 9.65 194.61 0.05 0.18
2014 5.63 1,0435 2.22 1,373.45 0.00 0.77 0.84 810 2.10 174.31 0.01 0.17
Table 4: Red Grouper and Gag Harvests and Discards, 2005-14. Columns report: TAC is
denoted in millions of pounds; N is the number of sample trips reporting positive harvest of
species i; % trips
(di>0)
denotes the percentage of sample trips reporting positive discards; hi/trip
is average pounds (all species) harvested per trip; dihi is the landings-weighted average ratio of
discarded to harvested pounds per trip; hi∑hj is the landings-weighted average harvest share of
species i in the trip harvest. Note that gag grouper was managed under an all shallow-water
grouper TAC of 9.98 million pounds from 2005-09.
The percentage of trips recording positive red grouper discards, and the red grouper discard-
harvest ratio begin to decline in 2007, the year that the red snapper IFQ program began.
The discard-harvest ratio for red grouper remains only slightly above zero during the GT-
IFQ regime. To understand the decline in discards in 2008-09 we look more closely at discard
patterns within each year, particularly during periods when the grouper fisheries were open and
when they were closed. In 2005-06, all species were managed with closures. Cross-referencing
trip-level data with date-specific regulations finds periods during which grouper fisheries were
closed while red snapper and other reef fish fisheries remained open. A combination of grouper
closures and red snapper opening occurred on 61 days during 2005-06. Class I and class II
reef fish fishermen who were permitted to land red snapper took trips during these grouper
closures. Our data show that on the 49 trips that took place during the 61 days in 2005-06,
the discard-harvest ratio for red grouper is exactly 1, i.e., 100% of the red grouper that was
harvested was discarded at sea. The pattern is the same for gag grouper; the discard-harvest
ratio was 0.97 in 2005 and 1 in 2006.
Red snapper closures ended in 2007 with the introduction of the IFQ regulation, but grouper
closures continued through 2009. In 2007 the red grouper discard-harvest ratio is 0.21 during
red grouper openings and 0.92 during red grouper closures. In 2008, the red grouper discard-
harvest ratio is 0.03 during openings and 0.57 during closures, while in 2009, the discard-harvest
ratio is 0.02 during openings and 0.70 during closures. Annual averages reported in table 4
mask this within-season pattern in part because the number of trips taken during grouper
closures is small, particulary from 2007 on.
During the 2005-09 controlled access regime, regulators often closed the red grouper and gag
grouper species fisheries concurrently. Note also that groupers accounted for roughly 40% of
trip revenue during 2005-09 (red snapper accounted for roughly 11%). When multiple grouper
species fisheries were closed, reef fish fishermen stayed in port, since roughly 40% of a typical
trips’ revenue was disallowed due to the closures. The small number of trips that were taken
resulted in the low annual average discard-harvest ratio (table 4). When the red snapper IFQ
program began, grouper discards declined dramatically. The reason is that the red snapper
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IFQ regulation allowed fishermen to harvest red snapper any time during the year; class I and
class II endorsement permit holders stopped fishing for red snapper during grouper closures,
thus causing the sharp decline in the grouper discard-harvest ratio.
As with red snapper, red grouper discards during the GT-IFQ regime, 2010-14, are near
zero. Gag grouper discards fall sharply under IFQ management but remain positive from 2011
through 2013. Notice that the gag grouper TAC was set at 1.41 m. pounds in the fist year of
the GT-IFQ regulation. The gag TAC dropped to 0.43 m. pounds in 2011, was raised slightly
to 0.54 m. pounds in 2012, and was raised again to 0.71 m. pounds in 2013. During these
years, the red grouper TAC remained relatively high.
The analysis of section 2 shows that a particularly tight quota for one species and a liberal
quota for another are precisely the conditions under which discarding fish at sea can lower
factor input costs. The ratio of gag to red grouper TAC ranged between 0.10-0.13 during
2011-13. In other words, an average quota holder was required by regulation to harvest one
pound of gag for every 10-13 pounds of red grouper.
Did CSF provision play a role in the higher 2010-13 gag grouper discards? The average
dockside price for gag grouper landings ranged from $4.55-$4.98 during 2010-13; the price for
red grouper ranged between $3.23-$3.59 during the same period. Let gag proxy for the higher
priced species 1 in figure 2. TACs place the average quota constraint in the north-west region
of the figure, i.e., regions II, III, VI and VIII. For quota allocations in regions III and VI,
discarding gag is raises private fishing profits. We investigate whether this very skewed mix of
harvests impacted discard incentives below.
Discard patterns for other reef fish species including vermilion snapper, other shallow water
groupers, deep water groupers and tilefish are reported in appendix 7 (table 9). Discard
patterns follow model predictions: discards for vermilion snapper which is an unregulated
species are effectively zero throughout the data period. The deep water grouper average
discard-harvest ratio declined from 2% in the first year of the GT-IFQ program to 0 % in
2013-14. The shallow water grouper and tilefish discard-harvest ratio has declined substantially
during the GT-IFQ regime but has lingered in the 2-5% range. A possible explanation is the
low TACs for these species; other shallow water grouper (tilefish) TACs have been set in the
range of 0.42-0.52 (0.44-0.58) million pounds during the 2010-14.
4.5 Quota-constrained discards: regression analysis
This section examines discard patterns using regression analysis to isolate multiple factors
which may influence the decision to discard fish at sea. We specify a linear probability model
of a discard event; the dependent variable is set equal to 1 if on trip j some or all harvested
species i fish is discarded and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables fall into two categories:
(1) regulations, and (2) controls for the fact that reef fish fishermen choose the spatial-temporal
stock conditions and prices under which each fishing trip occurs.
The regression we conduct seek to isolate causes of at-sea discards, conditional on having
taken a trip under the observed stock and economic conditions and on a positive harvest, i.e.,
if on a trip j hij = 0, dij is also 0. While the regression results we report inform the discard
patterns predicted in section 2, we cannot interpret the measured effects as the causal impacts
of regulation on discarding.
Our analysis must first address a limitation in our data wherein stock conditions are un-
observed by the researcher.28 Our data contain detailed information on the quantity of hooks,
lines, and soak time that fishermen set on each trip. We follow the fisheries stock assessment
literature to estimate stock abundance indices for red snapper, red grouper and gag grouper.
The method of stock estimation relies on the assumption that harvest will be proportional to
the quantity of gear allocated and the unobserved stock abundance(see SEDAR, 2014). Under
28Missing variable bias caused by unobserved stock variables may be particulary acute in trip level analysis
where stock conditions can vary substantially across time and space due to natural variation in the marine
environment.
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this assumption an index of stock abundance, referred to as catch per unit of effort (CPUE),
obtains from observable data, i.e., harvest and allocated gear. We detailed information on the
type and quantity of hooks and lines used on each trip, and the number of hours the gear is
soaked to estimate the following:
CPUEi,j =
hi,j
Ej
= Φ(Sj |βS) + βmMj + χi,j . (24)
In the above, hi,j is the quantity of species i harvested on trip j, Ej is the quantity of
gear allocated, referred to as effort in the stock assessment literature, on trip j. We measure
effort as the number of hooks that are set times the hours the hooks were soaked on the trip
(SEDAR, 2014). The term Φ(Sj |βs) is a polynomial function of the spatial subregion and the
date for trip j.29
The third term in (24), is a liner function of controls Mj thought to influence the con-
figuration of effort, plus other unobserved factors that may impact the CPUE relationship.
Elements of Mj also include a fisherman fixed effect (to capture time invariant unobserved
effects), species-specific prices, the price of inputs, and regulations in place at the time of the
trip, e.g., we use species-specific cumulative landings relative to the annual total allowable
catch, and an indicator for fishery closures.
The residual χi,j in equation 24 will represent the component of the trip j CPUE that is
unexplained by the model. Recall that Φ(Sj |βS) includes the spatial and temporal trip location
and Mj includes fishermen fixed effects, and the trip economic and regulatory conditions, all
variables that known to the vessel operator at the time that trip j begins. The residual
term can therefore be interpreted as an unanticipated component of CPUEi,j , or under the
assumptions above, the unanticipated stock abundance for species i on trip j. We exploit this
interpretation of the CPUE residual χij in our regressions.
To elaborate, if at-sea discards are caused by unanticipated quota overages then χˆi,j should
be positive correlated with discard events in our data. Moreover, CSF provisions allow fish-
ermen to legally land over-quota harvest under another species’ quota. The intent of CSF is
precisely to reduced discard arising from an unanticipated harvest overage. This suggests an
approach to test for the effectiveness of CSF provisions, i.e., if CSF provisions are working as
regulators anticipate, the impact of χˆi,j on discards will be less when multi-use quota is avail-
able. From table 1 for example, the effects of high abundance on red grouper discards should
be less when gag grouper multi-use quota is relatively large. The same principle applies to gag
discards, however, since red grouper multi-use quota was set a zero in most years, evidence of
the effects of CSF is not possible.
Testing for over-quota discarding and the effects of CSF provisions requires accurate infor-
mation on trip-specific quota holdings and/or information on the ability to acquire additional
quota when catch overages occur. We do not observe quota holdings directly. Our data con-
tain measures of quota scarcity. A first measure is the species-specific TAC. Because TACs
are set annually, however, their effect on discards cannot be separated from other factors that
vary annually. We construct a second quota scarcity measure as the proportion of the annual
TAC that has been landed at the time that trip j is taken. This measure of unfished quota
for species i on trip j is hereafter denoted UFQij ∈ [0, 1], and is interpreted as a measure if
tightness of species i quota market.
Table 5 reports linear probability regression results for red snapper, red grouper and gag
grouper discard events. We include trips taken during each species’ IFQ regulatory regime that
reported positive harvests of their respective species. Models include an indicator (dummy)
variable ’Longline gear’ to account for potential difference in discarding patterns relative to
handline, bandit and troll gear types. A linear trend is included to capture unobserved time-
varying changes in the incentive to discard fish, for example, adjustments in a fisherman’s
29Space delineations follow the GOM subregion designations 1-11. Time is composed of a within season (day
of the year) component and a trend that spans the entire 2005-14 data period.
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Red Snapper Red Grouper Gag Grouper
Est. Std. Err. p-val. Est. Std. Err. p-val. Est. Std. Err. p-val.
Constant -0.606 0.944 0.260 0.363 0.317 0.126 0.876 0.736 0.117
UFQij 0.054 0.042 0.099 0.027 0.017 0.060 0.057 0.056 0.157
TACi -0.063 0.042 0.065 0.002 0.018 0.454 -0.191 0.045 <0.001
χˆi,j 0.029 0.013 0.012 0.000 0.003 0.451 0.054 0.017 <0.001
χˆi,j×CSF − − − -0.163 0.300 0.294 -0.049 0.036 0.085
Trend -0.429 0.204 0.018 -0.046 0.118 0.347 -0.433 0.112 <0.001
Xˆij red snap. -0.106 0.325 0.372 0.211 0.107 0.025 -0.344 0.211 0.052
Xˆij red group. 0.001 0.065 0.493 -0.005 0.024 0.411 0.060 0.039 0.062
Xˆij gag group. 0.072 0.151 0.126 -0.088 0.058 0.065 0.099 0.075 0.093
Lonline gear 0.320 0.105 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.364 0.005 0.043 0.454
Landings price 0.004 0.057 0.474 0.008 0.013 0.269 0.062 0.040 0.061
Effort price 0.161 0.020 0.089 -0.039 0.035 0.136 -0.052 0.082 0.264
N = 4,664; R2 = 0.112 N = 3,928; R2=0.015 N=3,083; R2=0.090
Table 5: Red Grouper and Gag Discard Model.
portfolio of quota holdings over time. The data are an unbalanced panel with repeat trip
observations taken by 440 unique vessel operators. Table 5 reports robust standard errors that
are clustered at the level of the individual vessel.
The results find that the discard probability increases with quota scarcity; coefficients on
unfished quota, UFQij , are positive, although statistically different from zero at conventional
levels for red snapper and red grouper only. Coefficients on species’ annual aggregate quota,
TACi, are negative and statistically significant for red snapper and gag grouper; the coefficient
estimate is statistically and literally equal to zero for red grouper.
The effect of unanticipated stock abundance is positive and statistically significant for
red snapper and gag grouper (p-value are 0.012 and <0.001, respectively), suggesting evidence
that discarding may increase with an unanticipated high trip catch rate. When we interact χˆi,j
with multi-use quota we find an expected negative effect, although the estimate is statistically
insignificant for both red and gag grouper.
These findings should be interpreted with caution. Note first that the identification of CSF
effects on discards is rather limited. Multi-use quota is used for red and gag grouper only.
Furthermore, variation in the quantity of each species maximum multi-use quota, required to
identify the effect under investigation is limited. The data contain variation in gag grouper
multi-use quota and large maximum values in several years. The question is, were reef fish
fishermen inclined to use gag quota to land red grouper over-quota harvests? Below we present
evidence to suggest that CSF of this form likely was not utilized in the reef fish fishery.
The coefficient on the trend variable is negative for all species but statistically significant at
conventional levels (p-value <0.001) for gag only. This finding is consist with discard patterns
reported in table 4.
The coefficient estimates for the additional controls show no clear pattern and are not
discussed further.
4.6 More on regulations and discarding
A full calibration of the costly targeting technology introduced in section 2 allows further
investigation of the regulatory environment in the GOM reef fish fishery under the GT-IFQ
with CSF provisions regulation. Our calibration involves two additional steps: (1) aggregation
of factor inputs to form a composite input z, and (2) estimation of targeting technology in
equation (1). The methods used to construct the input aggregate follows Squires (1987) and
is discussed in appendix 7. We specify the following system of equations for estimation of the
two-species costly targeting technology:
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h1,j = h1,j + e1,j =
(
ν1
(
1 + sin
[ajpi
2
])
xµ1,j
)
(θzj)
γj + e1,j (25)
h2,j = h2,j + e2,j =
(
ν2
(
1 + cos
[ajpi
2
])
xµ2,j
)
(θzj)
γj + e2,j . (26)
The residual terms in (26), ei,j i = 1, 2, are assumed to represent deviations from the
mean harvest functions, hi,j for i = 1, /2. We assume ei,j are iid random terms with zero
means. Each is the result of exogenous natural variation in unobserved stock abundance which
is assumed uncorrelated with the spatial, temporal, economic and regulatory conditions that
influence the configuration of the aggregate input and/or targeting choice aj for the trip.
Observe that we have inserted the fitted aggregate input into equation (26). We must also
account for the fact that the trip j input, zj , is a public factor of production used to harvest
multiple reef fish species (in addition to h1,j and h2,j). The term θj ∈ (0, 1] is specified as a
function of the share of h1,j and h2,j in the total harvest of trip j. We assume θj follows:
θj =
exp(βθ
∑
h−i,j∑
hi,j
)
1 + exp(βθ
∑
h−i,j∑
hi,j
)
, (27)
where
∑
hj,−i∑
hj,i
is the share of all species harvested other than red and gag grouper. The
parameter βθ is a scale parameter reflecting the rate at which the public input zj contributes
to the harvest of other reef fish species.
Next we allow the trip j targeting parameter to vary with observed factors hypothesized
to impact fishermen’s targeting choices. aj is specified as,
aj =
exp(βaTj)
1 + exp(βaTj)
, (28)
where Tj is a vector of pre-determined variables that impact the targeting decision on trip j.
Elements of Tj includes prices and regulatory variables.
Generalized non-linear least squares is used to estimate the model parameters. Parameter
estimates, standard errors and p-value for a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the
estimated parameter is equal to zero are reported in table 6. Again, our data include multiple
observations on individual vessels. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported.
Three model specifications are included. In model specification 1, the targeting parameter
aj is set to a constant. This case represents a no targeting scenario, e.g., where reef fish
fishermen do not engage in directed harvesting of individual reef fish species but rather passively
allocate factor inputs to the fishery to obtain an exogenously determined harvest a mix, e.g., a
mix of species determined by stock conditions. The second and third specifications allow the
targeting parameter to be impacted with regulations and prices.
A test of the restrictions in specification 1, that targeting is unaffected by prices and
regulations, is rejected at conventional levels of significance (the F-statistic is 78.494 with 1%
critical value, 2.04). This result is consistent with evidence of targeting behavior reported in
tables 2, 3, and 4.
Estimates of the targeting technology parameters follow expectations. The red grouper
scale parameter estimate is 4-5 time larger that gag counterpart reflecting the dominance of
red grouper in the mix of harvested species in the GOM reef fish fishery. The estimate of the
stock index coefficient µ is positive across the three model specifications. The input elasticity
parameter γ ranges between 0.870-0.877 and is stable across specification. The magnitude of
the estimate indicates diminishing returns to the aggregate input at the trip level.
Model specification 2 includes both measures of quota scarcity; specification 3 drops the
measures of unfished quota, UFQij , i = 1, 2.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parm. Est. Std. err. p-val. Est. Std. err. p-val. Est. Std. err. p-val.
v1 1.026 0.363 0.005 2.290 1.280 0.074 2.128 0.843 0.012
v2 0.359 0.108 0.001 0.503 0.288 0.080 0.450 0.185 0.015
µ 0.247 0.053 < 0.001 0.167 0.056 0.003 0.148 0.052 0.004
γ 0.870 0.028 < 0.001 0.877 0.033 <0.001 0.876 0.031 <0.001
Targ. parameter: a =
exp(.)
1+exp(.)
Var. Est. Std. err. p-val. Est. Std. err. p-val. Est. Std. err. p-val.
Constant 1.049 0.206 <0.001 -66.973 14.322 < 0.001 -64.572 9.709 <0.001
UFQ1j − − − 2.817 2.747 0.305 − − −
UFQ2j − − − -0.319 2.663 0.905 − − −
TAC1 − − − 1.165 0.311 < 0.001 1.458 0.298 <0.001
TAC2 − − − -3.331 1.486 0.025 -4.196 1.305 0.001
MUQ2 − − − -1.891 1.511 0.211 -1.910 1.108 0.085
p1 − − − 1.321 0.869 0.128 1.153 0.730 0.115
p2 − − − -1.789 0.754 0.018 -1.761 0.648 0.007
wˆj − − − 8.342 2.001 < 0.001 8.092 1.306 <0.001
Input allocation: θ =
exp(.)
1+exp(.)
Var. Est. Std. err. p-val. Est. Std. err. p-val. Est. Std. err. p-val.
Constant -0.446 0.910 0.627 0.615 0.943 0.515 0.464 0.700 0.507
Sj,−i 2.625 0.726 <0.001 2.379 0.401 <0.001 2.484 0.328 <0.001
SSE =1,422.642 SSE = 1,140.201 SSE = 1,140.130
Table 6: Targeting Technology Calibration for Red and Gag Grouper.
4.6.1 Regulation and fisherman incentives in the GOM reef fish fishery
The parameters from specification 3 are used to investigate discarding incentives under the
GT-IFQ regime. As noted above, during 2011-13, discard/harvest ratios ranged between 5
% and 6% for gag grouper, but fell to almost zero for all other major reef fish species (table
4). During this period, regulators reduced the gag grouper TAC sharply and unilaterally in
response to stock assessment that showed declines in gag grouper abundance (see figure 9 on
appendix 7). We set prices and CPUE stock indices to average values in our 2012 data. We
then derive the optimal input allocation, targeting choice and species-specific discards over a
range of quota values.
Recall that our data do not contain quota holdings at the fisherman, or trip level. Annual
quota is delineated as share of annual TAC’s. In 2012, the red grouper and gag TAC’s were
set at 5.37 m. and 0.54 m. pounds, respectively. An average quota owner therefore may have
held species specific quotas in these same proportions. We do not observe quota trades and
as noted, quotas bind at the seasonal level not at the trip level. By evaluating fishermen’s
incentives over a range of quota holdings can illustrate incentives operational at least for a
subset of fishermen in 2012.
To facilitate comparisons with the analysis in figure 2 we hereafter designate gag grouper
as species 1 and red grouper as species 2. Consistent with 2012 CSF regulations, we allow 8%
of the gag quota to be used to land red grouper but do not allow any red grouper quota to be
used to land gag grouper.
Figure 8 plots the Lagrange multipliers for individual species’ landings constraints, ωi, i =
1, 2, the aggregate quota constraint multiplier λ, and the ratio of discards to harvests for
species 1 fish, gag grouper. No positive discards of red grouper obtained for the quota levels
considered in the baseline calibration. The range for gag quota, q1, is [0, 5]; the range for red
grouper quota, q2, is set at [5, 15].
The top panels show ωi, i = 1, 2 for different quota combinations. At low values for q1,
ω1 is positive and hovers around $3.50. When q2 is small ω2 is positive as required although
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Figure 8: Quota-Constrained Harvests and Discards, 2012.
its value does not exceed $2.50. The landings-weighted average prices for gag (species 1)
and red grouper (species 2) in 2012 were $4.87 and $3.32, respectively. The fitted values for
the constraint multipliers suggest that CSF, if available, would be used to land gag grouper.
Given the regulatory objective of rebuilding gag stocks, it was apparently wise to set red
grouper multi-use quota to zero.
The dashed line in figure 8 demarcates the skewed ratio of red to gag grouper quota:
5.37/0.54, or 9.94 pounds of red grouper per for pound of gag grouper. Observe that the ratio
of red to gag TACs in 2012 places quotas in the positive discard zone VI of figure 2. Utilizing
gag multi-use quota provision only skews the species mix further. From the top panels in figure
8 the option to utilize gag multi-use quota was likely rarely used.
The lower left panel shows the value of λ for different quota combinations. A useful exercise
holds q2 fixed at an intermediate level, say 10 units, and increases q1 from 0 through 5 (along
the solid line shown in the figure). As noted (q1, q2) = (0, 10) falls in zone VI of figure 2 with
l2 = q2 = h2 and l1 = q1 < h1. As q1 increases, λ declines initially as the species 1 constraint
is relaxed. λ then increases with q1 entering zone VIII in figure 2. Here the marginal profit
of additional harvest of both species is positive. The peak of the multiplier λ separates zone
VIII and IX. In zone IX it is optimal to use gag multi-use quota to land red grouper. Zone
IX is small. Holding q2 = 10, further increases in q1 cause the aggregate quota constraint to
become slack, i.e., lambda = 0 for q1/ge3, approximately.
The lower right panel in figure 8 suggests that tightening the gag TAC, while maintaining a
relatively high red grouper TACs may have encouraged gag discards in 2012, perhaps delaying
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the gag stock recovery. The dashed line shown in the lower right hand panel delineates the 2012
ratio of gag to red grouper TAC, which lies in discard zone VI. Note that similar gag quota
scarcity which persisted throughout 2011-13 may explain the higher discard/harvest ratios for
gag grouper during these same years (table 4).
5 Conclusion
Cross-species quota flexibility (CSF) may play a role in reducing discards due to unanticipated
over-quota discards. We find no evidence that such provisions reduced discards in the GOM
commercial reef fish fishery. CSF on the other hand invites fishermen to target and land higher
profit species against their flexible quota holdings. We characterize profit maximizing harvest
and discard choices under a costly targeting technology in a quota-regulated fishery with a
CSF provision. The analysis shows that harvest choices are impacted in complex ways by a
flexibility provision; harvests, landings and discards vary with prices, stock conditions, the
structure of the multi-species technology and the extent of flexibility allowed.
Our results highlight the main shortcoming of a CSF provision. Allowing fishermen flexibil-
ity to harvest their preferred mix of species constrains the regulators ability to control aggregate
harvest and discard outcomes under decentralized management. CSF limits the ability of the
regulator to steer the multi-species stock along a path that maximizes long term fishery value.
A balance must be struck between the discard-reducing benefits of a CSF provision and the
long term rent losses due to reduced control over stock abundance and growth.
We analyze a unique data set from the Gulf of Mexico commercial reef fish fishery. Evidence
suggests that commercial reef fish fishermen adjusted harvesting operations to manage the mix
of species that are harvested with their gear. The analysis finds that discarding was prevalent
under the command and control regulation which limited, severely for some vessels, the quantity
of individual species that could be legally landed on each trip. Discarding dropped sharply and
after 3-4 years fell to zero under quota regulations. The role of CSF provision in the decline in
discards could not be fully determined. Analysis of raw data, and trip-level analysis of discard
events found no evidence that CSF played an important role in reducing over-quota discards.
Calibration of our costly targeting model finds that the discards that did persist in the COM
reef fish fishery were likely caused by regulations that set skewed annual landings limits for
key reef fish species. Regulators who sought to rebuild gag stocks were wise to limit CSF in
a way that limited additional gag grouper harvests and landings; our analysis suggests such
flexibility, if offered, would have been directed at vulnerable gag grouper stocks.
A broader policy message that is strongly supported by our empirical results is that har-
vest/cost complementarity must be considered when setting annual total allowable catch limits
in multiple-species fisheries, particulary when one or more stocks are threatened by overfishing.
Evidence from the GOM reef fish fishery suggests that gag grouper stock rebuilding during
2011-14 were impacted by a decision to tightly constraint the gag grouper TAC in isolation, i.e.,
while concurrently maintaining relatively large red grouper and other reef fish species TAC’s.
Our results suggests the skewed TACs may have increased gag grouper discards. Allowing reef
fish fishermen to land over-quota harvests of gag grouper under a CSF provision would have
increased revenue, but would have also changed the mix of targeted and landed species across
multiple species or species groups. Designing a stock rebuilding plan in a setting with costly
individual species’ targeting and competition and interdependent growth among competing
species is a difficult problem and an important topic for future research.
Finally, this paper has focused on contemporaneous cross-species flexibility mechanisms in a
setting where at-sea discards are unobserved by the regulator and therefore cannot be counted
against fishermen’s quota holdings. Targeting and discards and the role of flexibility will
change with at-sea observability, raising new questions about the role of flexibility in addressing
management goals. The implications of allowing flexibility in the temporal dimension, e.g.,
allowing fishermen to bank or borrow quota across seasons also raises new questions for policy
design. Definitive answers to these policy questions is also reserved for future work.
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7 Appendix A
This appendix presents (1) Logbook data data descriptive statistics, (2) discard descriptive
statistics for vermilion snapper, other shallow water groupers, deepwater groupers and tilefish,
and (3) details and additional results from the construction of an aggregate input.
7.1 Logbook Data Descriptive Statistics.
The National Marine Fisheries Service logbook data reporting system collects trip-level land-
ings by species and other information for all vessels licensed to harvest Gulf of Mexico reef
fish, on all trips landing reef fish species. Our data contain 75,564 trip records taken during
2005-14 in the region of the Gulf east of the Mississippi delta.30 On 57,996 (76.8%) of trips
taken, operators were not required to report discards; discard information is available for the
remaining 17,568 (23.3%) of trips. On 12,125 (16.0%) of eastern trips, operators were required
to report both discard and trip expense information. Trip expense information is complete for
10,107 (13.4%) of the total trip records.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all trips w/out disc. w/disc. w/disc.&exp. w/disc.&exp.
Obs. 75,564 57,996 17,568 12,125 10,107
Days at sea 3.88 3.87 3.89 4.04 4.08
Crew size 2.34 2.33 2.38 2.44 2.46
Vess. Length 35.75 35.59 36.29 36.92 37.08
Total lbs./trip 1,470.27 1,424.55 1,621.23 1,776.77 1,850.56
Revenue/trip 4,611.50 4,464.53 5,096.70 5,555.23 5,847.80
Revenue Shares
Red Snap. 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.13
Verm. Snap. 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.08
Red Group. 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.28
Gag Group. 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.10
OSW Group. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
DW Group. 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
Tilefish 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table 7: Logbook Data Subset Comparison. The table reports average values across five subsets
of 2005-14 logbook trip records from the eastern GOM region. Column report sample averages
for: (1) all trips; (2) trips with no discard information; (3) trips with discard information; (4)
trips information on discards and expenses (but with incomplete fuel expenses) and; (5) trips
with discard and complete trip expense information. Revenues are reported in $2014.
Table 7 reports mean values for trip days at sea, crew size, vessel lengths, landed pounds,
revenue, and revenue shares for five data subdivisions. Trips recording discard and expense
information are on average longer, with larger crew, are taken by longer vessels, harvest more
pounds and collect higher revenues per trip. Difference across subsamples should be considered
when extrapolating results in section 4 to the broader reef fish fleet and fishery.
30Trips that harvested 75% of shark species were removed.
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Mean Std. 5’th % 50’th % 95’th %
Days at sea 4.08 3.30 1.00 3.00 11.00
Crew size 2.46 1.08 1.00 2.00 4.00
Labor exp. 1,856.12 1,777.17 235.18 1,397.44 5,314.62
Fuel exp. 562.48 554.35 70.04 407.72 1,555.44
Oth. exp. 757.96 1,004.74 16.32 402.49 2,645.71
Capital exp. 99.76 135.30 12.57 63.12 294.14
Revenue 5,847.80 7,488.57 185.51 3,116.15 21,242.80
Harvested lbs. 2,034.87 2,417.63 76.00 1,244.00 7,026.11
Cost Shares
Mean Std. 5’th % 50’th % 95’th %
Labor 0.58 0.12 0.37 0.58 0.77
Fuel 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.38
Other 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.19 0.39
Capital 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05
Table 8: Trip Characteristics, Revenue, Landings and Expense Descriptive Statis-
tics. N = 10,107. Values are reported in $2014.
7.2 Discard Descriptive Statistics: Other Reef Fish Species
Vermilion Snapper OSW Groupers DW Grouper Tilefish
Year N % trips
(di>0)
di
hi
TAC N % trips
(di>0)
di
hi
TAC N % trips
(di>0)
di
hi
TAC N % trips
(di>0)
di
hi
2005 244 15.98 0.02 9.98 473 37.42 0.26 1.02 89 16.85 0.15 0.44 44 2.27 0.04
2006 186 21.51 0.01 9.98 348 26.15 0.18 1.02 79 16.46 0.17 0.44 46 2.17 0.10
2007 337 29.38 0.02 9.98 554 19.31 0.14 1.02 190 15.79 0.13 0.44 101 8.91 0.08
2008 808 5.32 0.00 9.98 1,068 23.31 0.14 1.02 192 19.79 0.12 0.44 65 3.08 0.02
2009 530 2.26 0.00 9.98 635 19.06 0.17 1.02 156 4.49 0.02 0.44 86 5.81 0.04
2010 621 4.83 0.00 0.41 624 16.03 0.13 1.02 208 5.77 0.02 0.44 115 14.78 0.06
2011 879 1.48 0.00 0.41 871 13.43 0.09 1.02 224 6.70 0.02 0.44 103 20.39 0.11
2012 894 0.22 0.00 0.50 864 7.99 0.05 1.12 235 4.26 0.01 0.58 120 11.67 0.04
2013 847 0.24 0.00 0.52 818 8.81 0.04 1.12 244 1.23 0.00 0.58 103 5.83 0.02
2014 693 0.72 0.00 0.52 673 11.14 0.03 1.11 251 3.19 0.00 0.58 133 14.29 0.04
Table 9: Vermilion Snapper, Groupers-Tilefish Discards, 2005-14. TACs are reported in mil-
lions of pounds; N is the sample size; dihi is the landings-weighted average ratio of discarded to
harvested pounds.
7.3 CPUE index results
The fitted model in (24) is used to estimate species-specific CPUE at the spatial-temporal
location of each trip in our data. This fitted value will proxy for stock abundance in equation
(1).
Figure 9 plots the fitted species-specific stock indices, CPUE, across GOM subregions,
fishing depth, the day of the year and the cumulative day since January 1, 2005. Subregions
are numbered from 1-11; subregion 1 begins at the Florida Keys. Subregions 2-7 extend
northward along the west coast of Florida coast and subregions 8-11 extend eastward along
the Florida panhandle through the Alabama and Mississippi Gulf coasts.
Panel (a) shows that peak CPUE for the three major species considered occurs in subregions
4-6 which are west of Tampa Florida. From panel (b) we see that CPUE peaks in depths ranging
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Figure 9: Red Grouper, Gag Grouper and Red Snapper Stock Abundance.
from 100-400 feet; red snapper CPUE peaks at shallower depths (150-200 feet). Gag grouper
CPUE peaks in slightly deeper water than does red grouper. Panel (c) shows changes in
seasonal CPUE. Patterns are consistent with gag grouper winter spawning aggregations. Red
grouper CPUE peaks in mid-summer whereas red snapper CPUE shows no prevalent within
season pattern. Panel (d) reports long-term changes in CPUE. The figure shows a sharp decline
in the grouper CPUE during the early data years, 2005-08. The decline in gag grouper CPUE
continues through 2010. The results indicate that red snapper CPUE has remained stable
during the 2005-14 data period.
7.4 Input aggregation
We construct an input aggregate from four factor inputs, fuel, captain and crew labor, vessel
capital services and miscellaneous expenses, following approach in Squires (1987). Note that
consistent formation of an input aggregate requires an assumption of homothetic separability
of the multiple-species harvesting technology. We maintain this assumption throughout. We
estimate a system of 3 cost share equations (the miscellaneous expenses input cost share is
dropped), with log input quantities as RHS regressors. Cost share equations are estimated
with generalized least squares regression. The fitted parameters are then used to construct the
empirical counterpart to the scalae input z from equation (1), which we summarize in figure
10.
Panels (a) and (b) in figure 10 are histograms of the input index and its implicit price (in
$2014) for all observations in our data with complete discard and trip expense information (N
= 10,107). The input distribution shown in panel (a) is bimodal with the lower mode near
zero and a second larger mode at roughly unity. A segment of the GOM commercial reef fish
fleet consists of smaller vessel operations that take fewer and shorter trips than other more
dedicated commercial fishermen.
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Figure 10: Factor Input Aggregate.
Panels (c) and (d) show the distribution of harvested pounds and revenue per unit of the
input aggregate across all trip observations. All panels show considerable variation in the
trip-level data which is common in marine commercial fisheries.
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